04/03/2001 11:25 AM House JUD
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ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE
HOUSE JUDICIARY STANDING COMMITTEE
April 3, 2001
11:25 a.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Representative Norman Rokeberg, Chair
Representative Jeannette James
Representative John Coghill
Representative Kevin Meyer
Representative Ethan Berkowitz
Representative Albert Kookesh
MEMBERS ABSENT
Representative Scott Ogan, Vice Chair
COMMITTEE CALENDAR
HOUSE BILL NO. 4
"An Act relating to offenses involving operating a motor
vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft while under the influence of an
alcoholic beverage or controlled substance; relating to implied
consent to take a chemical test; relating to registration of
motor vehicles; relating to presumptions arising from the amount
of alcohol in a person's breath or blood; and providing for an
effective date."
- MOVED CSHB 4(JUD) OUT OF COMMITTEE
PREVIOUS ACTION
SHORT TITLE:OMNIBUS DRUNK DRIVING AMENDMENTS
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVE(S)ROKEBERG
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
01/08/01 0024 (H) PREFILE RELEASED 12/29/00
01/08/01 0024 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME -
REFERRALS
01/08/01 0024 (H) TRA, JUD, FIN
02/22/01 (H) TRA AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 17
02/22/01 (H) Heard & Held
02/22/01 (H) MINUTE(TRA)
02/27/01 (H) TRA AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 17
02/27/01 (H) Moved CSHB 4(TRA) Out of
Committee
02/27/01 (H) MINUTE(TRA)
02/28/01 0470 (H) TRA RPT CS(TRA) NT 1DNP 2NR
2AM
02/28/01 0471 (H) DNP: SCALZI, NR: KAPSNER,
KOOKESH;
02/28/01 0471 (H) AM: MASEK, KOHRING
02/28/01 0471 (H) FN1: (ADM); FN2: (ADM)
02/28/01 0471 (H) FN3: (COR); FN4: (CRT)
02/28/01 0471 (H) FN5: (HSS); FN6: (HSS)
02/28/01 0472 (H) FN7: (HSS); FN8: (HSS)
02/28/01 0472 (H) FN9: (LAW); FN10: (DPS)
02/28/01 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
02/28/01 (H) Heard & Held
MINUTE(JUD)
03/09/01 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
03/09/01 (H) Heard & Held
MINUTE(JUD)
03/12/01 (H) JUD AT 2:30 PM CAPITOL 120
03/12/01 (H) Heard & Held
MINUTE(JUD)
03/14/01 (H) JUD AT 2:15 PM CAPITOL 120
03/14/01 (H) Scheduled But Not Heard
03/16/01 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
03/16/01 (H) Heard & Held
MINUTE(JUD)
03/19/01 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
03/19/01 (H) Heard & Held
MINUTE(JUD)
03/21/01 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
03/23/01 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
03/23/01 (H) Heard & Held
MINUTE(JUD)
03/26/01 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
03/26/01 (H) Heard & Held
03/26/01 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
03/28/01 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
03/28/01 (H) Heard & Held
MINUTE(JUD)
03/29/01 (H) JUD AT 10:40 AM CAPITOL 120
03/29/01 (H) Heard & Held
MINUTE(JUD)
03/30/01 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
03/30/01 (H) Scheduled But Not Heard
03/31/01 (H) JUD AT 11:00 AM CAPITOL 120
03/31/01 (H) Heard & Held
MINUTE(JUD)
MINUTE(JUD)
MINUTE(JUD)
04/03/01 (H) JUD AT 11:00 AM CAPITOL 120
WITNESS REGISTER
JANET SEITZ, Staff to Representative Rokeberg
Alaska State Legislature
Capitol Building, Room 118
Juneau, Alaska 99801
POSITION STATEMENT: Explained proposed Amendment 1 to Version B
of HB 4.
DEAN J. GUANELI, Chief Assistant Attorney General
Legal Services Section-Juneau
Criminal Division
Department of Law
P.O. Box 110300
Juneau, Alaska 99811-0300
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified on HB 4.
MARY MARSHBURN, Director
Division of Motor Vehicles
Department of Administration
3300B Fairbanks Street
Anchorage, Alaska 99503
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified on HB 4.
ACTION NARRATIVE
TAPE 01-54, SIDE A
Number 0001
CHAIR NORMAN ROKEBERG called the House Judiciary Standing
Committee meeting to order at 11:25 a.m. Representatives
Rokeberg, James, Coghill, Meyer, Berkowitz, and Kookesh were
present at the call to order.
HB 4 - OMNIBUS DRUNK DRIVING AMENDMENTS
Number 0024
CHAIR ROKEBERG announced that the first order of business would
be HOUSE BILL NO. 4, "An Act relating to offenses involving
operating a motor vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft while under
the influence of an alcoholic beverage or controlled substance;
relating to implied consent to take a chemical test; relating to
registration of motor vehicles; relating to presumptions arising
from the amount of alcohol in a person's breath or blood; and
providing for an effective date." [Before the committee was
CSHB 4(TRA), as amended.]
Number 0041
CHAIR ROKEBERG made a motion to adopt the proposed committee
substitute (CS) for HB 4, version 22-LS0046\B, Ford, 4/2/01, as
a work draft.
Number 0051
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ objected to ask if Version B
incorporates all the previously adopted amendments.
Number 0070
CHAIR ROKEBERG said yes, with the exception of [an inadvertently
omitted portion] that is addressed by a new clarifying amendment
from the drafter. Chair Rokeberg noted that there were no
further objections. Therefore, Version B was before the
committee as a work draft.
Number 0100
CHAIR ROKEBERG made a motion to adopt Amendment 1 [22-
LS0046\B.1, Ford, 4/3/01], which read:
Page 17, lines 19 - 21:
Delete all material and insert:
"(4) the court shall, if the person has
been previously convicted
(A) order the motor vehicle, aircraft, or
watercraft used in the commission of the offense
forfeited under AS 28.35.036 or shall order the motor
vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft taken to the owner's
residence or property and immobilized for the period
of time that the person's driver's license is revoked;
the court shall also require the person to pay any
administrative costs of keeping the motor vehicle,
aircraft, or watercraft immobilized; and
(B) two or more times, order the motor
vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft used in the
commission of the offense forfeited under
AS 28.35.036."
Page 26, lines 9 - 11:
Delete all material and insert:
"(4) the court shall, if the person has
been previously convicted
(A) order the motor vehicle, aircraft, or
watercraft used in the commission of the offense
forfeited under AS 28.35.036 or shall order the motor
vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft taken to the owner's
residence or property and immobilized for the period
of time that the person's driver's license is revoked;
the court shall also require the person to pay any
administrative costs of keeping the motor vehicle,
aircraft, or watercraft immobilized; and
(B) two or more times, order the motor
vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft used in the
commission of the offense forfeited under
AS 28.35.036; and"
Number 0125
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL objected for purposes of discussion.
Number 0142
JANET SEITZ, Staff to Representative Rokeberg, Alaska State
Legislature, explained that the concept in Amendment 1
previously had been contained in Amendment 36, but that the
concept was deleted when [Version B] was prepared. Amendment 1
restores the deletion, saying in (4)(A) that on a second
offense, forfeiture or impoundment of the vehicle shall be
ordered by the court, and in (4)(B) that on the third or
subsequent offense, the court shall order the vehicle's
forfeiture.
CHAIR ROKEBERG said he thinks that was the intention of the
committee.
MS. SEITZ said Amendment 1 amends both the driving under the
influence (DUI) section and the refusal section [AS 28.35.030
and AS 28.35.032].
CHAIR ROKEBERG said the question is whether it is necessary to
have the word "and" [after "immobilized;"] on lines 10 and 24 of
Amendment 1. He said he thinks it should either be "disjunctive
or deleted in its entirety; it's a matter of drafting style."
Number 0231
DEAN J. GUANELI, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Legal
Services Section-Juneau, Criminal Division, Department of Law,
said he thought Chair Rokeberg was correct: saying "and" is
incorrect; beyond that, "whether it's nothing or whether it's
'or' amounts to the same thing." He offered that "or" would be
clearer to most people.
Number 0252
CHAIR ROKEBERG offered a conceptual amendment to Amendment 1 "to
get it right" one way or the other.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said he thought saying "or" was good.
CHAIR ROKEBERG withdrew his conceptual amendment to Amendment 1.
Number 0270
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ offered a new conceptual amendment to
Amendment 1:
On lines 10 and 24, delete "and" and insert "or".
CHAIR ROKEBERG noted that there were no objections to the
conceptual amendment to Amendment 1. Therefore, the conceptual
amendment to Amendment 1 was adopted.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ, returning to Amendment 1, said:
"We're still operating under mandatory forfeiture here."
CHAIR ROKEBERG said yes, on the third offense.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said he thought forfeiture was also
mandatory on the second offense.
CHAIR ROKEBERG said Amendment 1 allows for the discretion of the
judge with regard to forfeiture.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ countered that the language says either
they "shall" forfeit the vehicle or they "shall" immobilize it.
CHAIR ROKEBERG confirmed that; he added that there is further
provision for the co-owner or other owner to get a release. He
then asked Ms. Seitz for confirmation.
MS. SEITZ recalled, "We took those out, did we not, when we
deleted the forfeiture program?"
Number 0386
MARY MARSHBURN, Director, Department of Motor Vehicles,
testified by teleconference. She said Ms. Seitz was correct -
the [provisions for release to a co-owner or other owner] had
been removed.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ requested more clarification about the
provisions that allow the co-owner or [other owner] to release
the vehicle.
CHAIR ROKEBERG noted [that provisions for release to a co-owner
or other owner] are in the bill with regard to licensing and the
license plates, but not with regard to the immobilization.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ replied, "But not for the forfeiture."
CHAIR ROKEBERG said he thinks [another owner] or co-owner is
protected under the current forfeiture law.
MS. SEITZ said that is only in the Municipality of Anchorage
ordinance, not state statute.
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked Mr. Guaneli if, in fact, adopting this
amendment leaves the judge without a provision to allow a co-
owner or other owner to obtain the automobile.
MR. GUANELI opined that the courts always have discretion, and
also have the duty to protect the interests of innocent owners.
Noting that there is a difference between an innocent owner and
a co-owner, he went on to say, "I think if the co-owner is an
innocent owner, we cannot constitutionally take [away] their
interest in a car or any piece of property."
CHAIR ROKEBERG clarified that there had been provisions [for
protecting the interests of innocent owners and co-owners], "but
they may have been removed when we did not adopt the civil
proceedings." He suggested the committee conclude the issue of
Amendment 1 and then move on to the issue of [proposing] a
conceptual amendment instructing the drafter to make sure that
those provisions are included in HB 4, if not already covered
under current statute.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ pointed out that under Title 4, there
is language regarding forfeiture, and he said he thinks there is
a fairly extensive description of how to proceed with the
forfeiture in those cases.
CHAIR ROKEBERG said there is, and that there is a default back
to the criminal forfeiture. But "just in case," he added, they
could have a conceptual amendment instructing the drafter to
make certain that the interest of the innocent co-owner and the
other owner can be preserved, even in an impoundment situation.
Number 0610
CHAIR ROKEBERG remade the motion to adopt Amendment 1 [as
amended]. There being no further objection, Amendment 1 [as
amended] was adopted.
Number 0656
CHAIR ROKEBERG made a motion to adopt Conceptual Amendment 2:
"Instructing the drafter - if need be - to make sure the
provisions of the immobilization on the second offense and any
forfeiture provides for the protection of an innocent co-owner
or lien holder and so forth, [so] that those interests will be
protected." There being no objection, Conceptual Amendment 2
was adopted.
MR. GUANELI proposed a technical amendment. He directed
attention to page 17, lines [9-10], and suggested that "except
as provided under (1)(A)(i) of this subsection," be stricken,
since it applied to the suspended imposition of sentence (SIS)
provision related to the .08 diversion program, which has since
been deleted.
Number 0750
CHAIR ROKEBERG made a motion to adopt this suggestion as
Conceptual Amendment 3. There being no objection, Conceptual
Amendment 3 was adopted.
MR. GUANELI then directed attention to page 24 [lines 7-9],
Section 39, which is a provision that allows testing pursuant to
a search warrant. The district attorney has told him that there
is another situation that can arise when a person passes the
breathalyzer tests and yet is obviously under the influence of
something. In those circumstances, Mr. Guaneli thinks it is
appropriate that the police be allowed to call a judge, describe
the circumstances, and get authorization to test for substances
other than alcohol. He proposed language for another technical
amendment: on page 24, at the end of line 9, after "judicial
officer" insert ", in addition to a test permitted by this
section".
MR. GUANELI explained that at least one judge in Juneau has said
that if a person takes the breath test, there is no opportunity
for further testing because the breath test is all that is
permitted by statute, and "I think that additional language
makes it clear that there are going to be rare circumstances
where it is appropriate to do an additional test pursuant to a
warrant."
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked what the current procedure is, if a person
appears to be under the influence of a controlled substance.
Number 0903
MR. GUANELI said he thinks that in most areas in the state,
police would need a warrant to test for a controlled substance.
If circumstances are such that the person has to be taken to a
hospital, the hospital is going to take some blood, which will
show if the person is under the influence of a narcotic. But in
those cases in which the person does not need to go to a
hospital, the only thing authorities can do is to get a warrant.
He said he thinks it is good that this section allows warrants,
but since a judge has ruled that once you've used the
breathalyzer machine, you can't do any further testing, he
thinks it is important to include language that allows testing
in addition to that specifically permitted by this section,
because that is the only way police can get the needed evidence.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said he was curious as to what the
judge's ruling was - here in Juneau - and how judges have ruled
in other parts of the state. He voiced reluctance to pass a law
based on a single anecdote.
MR. GUANELI said the basis for the judge's ruling was, "The
implied consent statute is here, and that tells you what tests
you can use, and you can't use anything more." He said he did
not know how judges have ruled in other parts of the state, but
he didn't think it did any harm to add that clause.
CHAIR ROKEBERG added, "And logically because the test is
permitted in the section."
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ argued:
If the other protection[s] of the search warrants are
in place, which they necessarily would be, then this
would be unnecessary to add. It seems to me that in
seeking a warrant to draw blood, you're seeking that
warrant in order to obtain evidence. Is that correct?
And there's provision under a search warrant procedure
to do that now.
MR. GUANELI replied, "All I can tell you is that the position of
the presiding judge in Juneau was that once you've used the
breath test, you can't do any follow-up testing."
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ asked if that is under appeal.
MR. GUANELI said that strictly speaking, those kinds of
decisions cannot be appealed. A petition can be lodged with the
court of appeals, and then it's discretionary. He added that he
did not know whether there was a petition lodged in that case.
Number 1079
CHAIR ROKEBERG said it seems to him that it is the
responsibility of the House Judiciary Standing Committee to make
sure that the laws are applied evenly in all judicial districts
of the state, notwithstanding a particular ruling, and that he
thinks this "calls out for clarification."
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said it may or may not:
What Mr. Guaneli is asking us to do is based on a
single instance in Juneau, without knowing what the
rulings have been in other parts of the state, without
having let the judicial process run its course, for us
to intercede. And I know how frustrated we get when
the judges jump in before we're done doing our
business. I think we ought to let the judges do their
business and then if there's still a problem, take
another look at it.
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked how long this ruling has been in effect.
MR. GUANELI said he did not know, but he could inquire of the
district attorney. He added that his impression is that it is
fairly recent because district attorney notified him only a few
days ago.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL posed the question of how many times
multiple tests could occur. He also asked whether the ability
to impose multiple tests could become a misused tool. Aside
from the goal of catching wrongdoers, there is also the
potential to use this sort of thing to intimidate people, he
added.
MR. GUANELI responded that the kind of evidence that comes from
these tests is evidence that dissipates over a period of time,
and therefore the testing needs to occur fairly quickly. He
opined that this is one factor that will limit the potential for
harassment. He added that a single blood test is useful to
screen for a number of substances, so, as a practical matter,
there is no need to impose further testing.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL noted that sometimes people may have
substances in their blood that do not cause impairment at the
time that the blood test is taken. He asked if [law
enforcement] is going to start looking for those types of
things.
Number 1264
MR. GUANELI acknowledged that the kinds of residual amounts of
drugs that can remain in the system might very well show up on a
test, but they would show up as background amounts, which would
not intoxicate somebody, and [law enforcement] is really looking
for higher levels of drugs in order to bring forth a case. He
added that many steps have to be taken to prosecute a [DUI] case
involving controlled substances. Not only does the blood test
have to be taken, but an expert witness must be called in to
interpret the results of that test; in addition, there has to be
evidence that links the blood test result with someone's driving
such as an officer's testimony regarding how the defendant was
actually driving at the time of arrest.
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES noted that Mr. Guaneli has finally
mentioned the fact that the reason the person is arrested in the
first place is because he/she had done something to indicate a
lack of control. Based on this assumption, if the breathalyzer
did not indicate a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) level of
.08, she said that [law enforcement] would still have to make
the presentation before a judge that the person was showing
signs of some other influence in order to get a search warrant
to perform a blood test.
MR. GUANELI agreed. He also noted that certain physical
indicators coupled with erratic driving behavior fall under the
probable cause standard.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ asked whether a person found to have a
controlled substance in his/her bloodstream could be charged
with possession based on the presence of the substance in the
bloodstream.
MR. GUANELI confirmed that this is possible, as long as there is
also further evidence present to indicate how the substance got
in the person's blood, such as syringes or other paraphernalia.
He added that case law says that the mere fact of having a
controlled substance in the bloodstream is not sufficient for
prosecution of a possession charge.
Number 1453
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ noted that there is also the
possibility that people who "blow under a .08" and yet have
demonstrated signs of impairment might, indeed, not have any
other substances in their bloodstream; they might be ill or they
might have been adjusting a radio. He asked at what point "we"
tell law enforcement that they cannot pursue a case any further.
MR. GUANELI responded that there is a lot of training that goes
into being a law enforcement officer, particularly surrounding
issues of DUI. He opined that most officers have seen an awful
lot if they have been on road patrol for even a short period of
time; at some point it has to be left to the officer's
discretion to be able to determine whether someone is simply
sleepy, sick, or suffering from a sprained ankle. He added that
"we" rely on the officer's discretion in applying for any other
type of search warrant in any other type of case, and that it is
appropriate to rely on the officer's discretion in DUI cases as
well.
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES brought up the point that there are a lot
of prescribed medications that specifically instruct people not
to consume alcohol while taking the medication, and sometimes
just a little alcohol will make a profound difference in the way
the medication affects people. She opined that a person could
make the argument that he/she is "not guilty of anything bad,"
but her response to such a defense is, "You've been told [to]
not have alcohol with it, number one, and if you're not in
condition to be driving a vehicle, then it is your problem."
MR. GUANELI agreed.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ commented that the [suggested change in
language] is trying to fix a problem before knowing that the
problem really truly exists - whether there is some kind of
judicial impediment to obtaining these kinds of warrants. He
also said that this language change is being proposed without
the kind of full and fair evidentiary hearing that would
normally, at least in a judicial context, accompany a
constitutional question. "We're doing it without, to this
point, hearing from folks who might have an opposing viewpoint,
and I'm very uncomfortable tinkering with the Fourth Amendment
in this way," he added.
Number 1623
CHAIR ROKEBERG said that although he appreciated this point, he
values the credibility of Mr. Guaneli. Chair Rokeberg also said
that he is not as concerned about the constitutionality issue,
given that the [blood] tests are already provided for in this
section [of Version B]. He surmised that they were simply
discussing the methodology since the tests are already provided
for.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ argued that the basis for denying the
warrant is that it would be considered an unreasonable search -
an unreasonable seizure.
CHAIR ROKEBERG clarified that this point is not raised by Mr.
Guaneli's suggested change to the language.
MR. GUANELI confirmed this interpretation. He said that this
suggested change is based on statutory construction; there are
courts that are taking the implied consent law - the law that
allows for breath tests - and construing it in a limited way to
preclude the administration of other types of tests, even
pursuant to warrant. He opined that his suggested change to the
language simply tells the court that it cannot construe the
statute in this fashion because it is not what is intended by
the legislature.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ argued that "we're construing this
within the context of the Fourth Amendment; it's a warrant
question."
CHAIR ROKEBERG said he disagreed; it is a matter of the test
methodology and the number of tests that are already authorized
by statute that can be given, he added.
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES said that they certainly were talking about
the Fourth Amendment, but she also noted that they were
discussing a judicial decision. She opined, "It's still
discretionary, to the judge in this case, as to whether or not a
search and seizure is allowed for this." She also opined that
certainly the judiciary is going to be concerned about Fourth
Amendment rights.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ offered that the suggested change in
language would overturn - or take away - the judiciary's
discretion on a case-by-case basis, and he noted that the
committee has neither seen the Juneau court's decision nor
investigated whether any other [judicial] districts have looked
at the question and come up with the same ruling.
CHAIR ROKEBERG said that in terms of intrastate judicial
opinion, there has been enough discussion on the issue raised by
Mr. Guaneli's suggested change in language, although he
acknowledged that in terms of a constitutional question, more
discussion would be in order, as Representative Berkowitz points
out. Chair Rokeberg noted that he would work with
Representative Berkowitz and the attorney general to ensure
clarification on this issue.
Number 1763
CHAIR ROKEBERG made a motion to adopt the suggested change in
language as Conceptual Amendment 4, on page 24, at the end of
line 9, after "judicial officer", to insert ", in addition to a
test permitted by this section".
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ objected.
Number 1820
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives James, Coghill,
Meyer, and Rokeberg voted for Conceptual Amendment 4.
Representatives Berkowitz and Kookesh voted against it.
Therefore, Conceptual Amendment 4 passed by a vote of 4-2.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL referred to page 19, [subsection] (n),
and page 28 [subsection (p)]. He noted that [these subsections]
talk about someone who has been previously convicted two times,
and then go on to list specific sentences, depending on how many
previous convictions a person has. He said it seems like a
mismatch to him, and he requested clarification because it
appears to say "if a person is convicted" and then steps back
and specifies minimum sentences.
CHAIR ROKEBERG clarified that this provision lists the minimum
sentences imposed, depending on how many prior convictions a
person has at the class C felony level.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ further clarified that not every third-
time offense becomes a felony, due to the ["look back"]
provisions.
CHAIR ROKEBERG remarked that Ms. Seitz will be preparing a
"reading guide" which will illustrate that approximately half of
[Version B] simply makes the [refusal provisions] mirror the DUI
provisions, and another major portion of [Version B] changes the
DUI provisions so that they include inhalants. He also informed
members that he would be providing them with the packet that
will accompany HB 4 as it progresses to the House Finance
Committee, so that members may relay to him any questions or
concerns regarding [Version B, as amended].
CHAIR ROKEBERG, for the benefit of agency representatives, said:
The issue regarding the calculation of the .08 BAC --
I think that we have had sufficient evidence from the
Department of Public Safety to demonstrate that ...
they should use the 5 percent increase in BAC [.08]
apprehensions, not the 10 or 15 percent, when
calculating their fiscal notes, ... because I'm going
to recommend that to the finance committee .... ... I
think ... that we've had sufficient evidence to go
with that, and I just want to caution everybody when
they're developing their fiscal notes.
Number 1979
REPRESENTATIVE JAMES moved to report CSHB 4, version 22-
LS0046\B, Ford, 4/2/01, as amended, out of committee with
individual recommendations and the accompanying fiscal notes.
There being no objection, CSHB 4(JUD) was reported from the
House Judiciary Standing Committee.
ADJOURNMENT
Number 1994
There being no further business before the committee, the House
Judiciary Standing Committee meeting was adjourned at 12:01 p.m.
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